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This chapter SURSRVHV WR ORRN DW RQHRI WKH OHVV VWXGLHG DVSHFWVRI&DVVLXV'LR·VQDUUDWLYHRI WKH
decline of the Republic, namely the dictatorship. It argues that, in keeping with his especial interest 
LQWKH5HSXEOLF·VLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGFRQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUN'LREelieved that the collapse of the res 
publica DQG HPHUJHQFH RI $XJXVWXV· 3ULQFLSDWH ZDV LQWLPDWHO\ FRQQHFWHG WR WKH IDLOXUHV³
constitutional, practical, and reputational³RI 5RPH·V HPHUJHQF\ PDJLVWUDF\ ,W VKRZV WKDW DV D
monarchist, Dio believed that the Republic could only survive intact while it had a temporary 
recourse to legitimate and temporary monarchy under restrictions agreed by the community³
dictatorship³and that this view perhaps emerges more from a reading of Cicero than from his fellow 
Greek historians. However, the failure of the dictatorship to inspire confidence in the wake of Sulla, 
especially in the 60s and 50s BCE, as well as its practical and legal restrictions, led to a greater 
number of corrosive extraordinary commands and other destructive innovations. The solution, for 
Dio, ultimately lay in Augustus, who (like Pompey) recognised the flaws in the dictatorship and 





The consular elections of 54 were a chaotic affair even by Late Republican standards, and 
represent a critical turning point in Roman constitutional history.
1
 Arguably, genuine 
Republican government had already ceased to function six years previously with the three-
headed monster; but the actual collapse of Republican institutions must be credited to the latter 
half of the 50s.
2
 After many delays, by mid-October 54 all four candidates for the consulship of 
the following year had been charged with bribery.
3
 One of the hopefuls, C. Memmius, 
confessed in the Senate that he and another candidate had formed a secret agreement with the 
incumbent consuls, Cato and Ahenobarbus: these ZHUH WR VXSSRUW 0HPPLXV· FDQGLGDF\ LQ
return for juicy consular provinces if he should EH HOHFWHG 0HPPLXV· FRQIHVVLRQ ZDV
(allegedly) instigated and encouraged by Pompey.
4
 Attempts by the interreges to hold the 
comitia were checked by unfavourable omens and deliberate obstruction by tribunes.5 Amid 
this crisis rumours were circulating of a plan to appoint Pompey as dictator, evidently with the 
support of the newly-elected tribune for 53, C. Lucilius Hirrus.
6
 This did not come to pass. 
Plans for a dictatorship for Pompey fell through: some time earlier in 53 he declined the office, 
and Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messalla Rufus finally entered office in the 
                                                          
*
 I wish to thank, in particular, Josiah Osgood (Georgetown) for his helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this 
paper, and especially for drawing the important article of John Ramsey to my attention. I am also grateful to Chris 
Baron (Notre Dame) for his corrections and comments, and to Kathryn Welch (Sydney) for her guidance on the 
FRQWURYHUVLHVVXUURXQGLQJ%UXWXV·FRLQDJHZKLFK,KDYHLQFOXGHGFDXWLRXVO\EHORZ 
1
 So Arena 2012 1, n.2. 
2
 +HQFH&LFHUR·VJULPDOOXVLRQ LQ$SULO WR3RPSH\·VVXSSRVHG ¶OLVW·RISODQQHG IXWXUHFRQVXOV DWAtt. 4.8a.2.  
Steel 2013, 183 is right to treat this with a little scepticism, although compare App. B.Civ. 2.19 on the events of the 
VDPH\HDU¶WKHFRQVXOVKROGLQJRIILFH\HDUO\FRXOGQRWKRSHWROHDGDUPLHVRUWRFRPmand in war because they 
ZHUHVKXWRXWE\WKHSRZHURIWKHWULXPYLUDWH· 
3
 Cic. Att. 4.18.3. Previously only three were implicated: see Att. 4.17. For the candidates, see Gruen 1969. 
4
 Cic. Att. 4.17.2²3.  
5
 Cass. Dio 40.45.3. 
6
 Cic. Q. Fr. 3.8.4²6, 3.9.3; Plut. Pomp. 54.2²3. 
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summer of that year,
7
 when the contest for the QH[W\HDU·VDSSRLQWPHQWVZDVDOUHDG\XQGHUZD\ 
That is not to say that Pompey emerged from the crisis of the preceding two years empty-
handed, however: a compromise, seemingly orchestrated by the interrex Servius Sulpicius, had 
PoPSH\ HOHFWHG E\ WKH SHRSOH QRW ¶DSSRLQWHG· E\ WKH 6HQDWH VR LW VHHPV WR WKH VROH
consulship for 52 with senatorial consent.
8
 He entered office on the 24
th
 day of the intercalary 
month between February and March.  
To this point our main surviving sources for this crisis³Appian, Asconius, Cassius Dio, 
Cicero, and Plutarch³are broadly in agreement. 7KHUHDOFRQWURYHUV\HPHUJHVZLWK3RPSH\·V
role in the episode and his motivations, especially regarding the dictatorship. According to 
Appian, Pompey was eager for the honour in 54²53 DQGLQGHHG¶GHOLEHUDWHO\oversaw HYHQWV·
so as to bring it about (ưƜƭƨૃ ਫ਼ưƥƱƯƱ૵ƭƴƯƲ ਥưƟƴƧƤƥƲ).9 The desire to engineer a crisis would 
certainly explain 3RPSH\·V eagerness for Memmius to confess publicly his scandalous pact with 
Cato and Ahenobarbus. Appian alleges that Pompey deliberately postponed the comitia to 
exert the maximum damage, all the while publicly making a show of rejecting the dictatorship.
10
 
For Appian and also Plutarch,
11
 3RPSH\·V VFKHPLQJZDVRQO\ VFRWFKHGE\ &DWR DQG%LEXOXV
ZRUNLQJ WRJHWKHU WR RSSRVH WKH ¶XQDGXOWHUDWHG W\UDQQ\ RI D GLFWDWRUVKLS· ƴોƲ ਕƪƱƜƴƯƵ ƪơ੿ 
ƴƵƱơƭƭƩƪોƲ ਥƪƥƟƭƧƲ) and proposing the consulship sine collega as an innovative³but not 
unpalatably radical³compromise.12 7KH\PDLQWDLQWKDW3RPSH\·VGHVLUHIRUWKHGLFWDWRUVKLSZDV
consistent throughout and his refusals a sham:
13
 evidently he willed it in late 54, through 53, and 
HYHQHDUO\LQKHQFH&DWRDQG%LEXOXV·SURSRVDO%XWin so doing they conflate the situation 
in late 54, when there were consuls in office, with 53 and 52, when there were not. In 54 an 
appointment to the dictatorship was possible in the regular way, by the incumbent consuls ex 
senatus consulto. In 53, on the other hand, this was quite impossible; the only (understandably 
unattractive) option would be to revive the precedent of Sulla in an extraordinary appointment 
to the dictatorship by an interrex.14  
&DVVLXV'LR·VWDNHRQWKHFULVLVLVTXLWHGLIIHUHQW'LR·s Pompey emerges as the saviour 
of the electoral debacle of 54²53. Voluntarily declining the dictatorship in 53 upon returning to 
Rome, he takes pains to have Calvinus and Messalla Rufus elected, and in his sole consulship 
acted in accordance with the wishes of the Senate by eschewing the temptation to rouse an 
already excited plebs.15 ,Q D WRXFK WKDW LV HQWLUHO\ 'LR·V LQYHQWLRQ Pompey is even made to 
detest the prospect of a consulship sine collega (!) ¶KHGLGQRWZLVK WRKROGRIILFHDORQH IRU
now that he had the glory that lay in the passing of such a vote, he wished to avoid the envy 
                                                          
7
 Cass. Dio 40.45.1 writes that Calvinus and Messalla were elected in the seventh month, but App. B.Civ. 2.19 in 
the eighth. 
8
 6HH5DPVH\IRUDQH[FHOOHQWUHFHQWGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVVXUURXQGLQJ3RPSH\·VSRVLWLRQas sole 
FRQVXOLQ2XUDQFLHQWVRXUFHVVXJJHVWWKDWWKH6HQDWHDUURJDWHGWRLWVHOIWKHDXWKRULW\WR¶DSSRLQW·3RPSH\DV
sole consul, so Liv. Per. 107, Val. Max. 8.15.8, Plut. Caes. 28.7, App. B.Civ. 2.23.84, and Cass. Dio 40.50.4; 
modern historians have tended to follow this cue. Ramsey suggests (particularly from a reading of Asconius) that 
Pompey was in fact elected per interregem.  
9
 App. B.Civ. 2.19. 
10
 App. B.Civ. 2.20. This seems excessively cynical, but the recusatio is characteristic: see Vervaet 2010. 
11
 Plut. Caes. 28.7. 
12
 App. B.Civ. 2.23.1; for the quote, Plut. Pomp. 54.3. See Ramsey 2016, 308²318 for discussion of the ways in 
which the proposal may have been made acceptable to conservatives.  
13
 So Meyer 1922, 210.  
14
 6HH5DPVD\ ¶3RPpey may well have found the dictatorship less appealing in 53 than he did in the 
latter half of 54, when his appointment could have been made in the time-honoured, non-Sullan manner by one of 
the consuls still in office. Vervaet 2020, 155²«IDLOVWRGLVWLnguish between conditions in 54, when consuls were 
VWLOOLQRIILFHDVFRPSDUHGZLWKDQGZKHQWKHFRQVXOVKLSZDVYDFDQW· 
15
 Cass. Dio 40.46, 40.50. 
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DVVRFLDWHGZLWKLW·16 The desire to keep Caesar out of office emerges as a secondary motive on 
his part in Dio; this is unlikely to have been a real concern at this point in 52, since Caesar had 
a certain Vercingetorix to deal with. 'LR·VPompey is, in other words, made to adopt (certainly) 
VRPHRQHHOVH·V philosophical justification for a ¶5HSXEOLFDQ·course of action he (probably) did 
not intend. 3HUKDSVWKHKLVWRULDQ·VSRVLWLYHYLHZRIWKHJHQHUDOKHUHPD\EHLQVSLUHGE\&LFHUR
In a letter of November 54, Cicero is equivocal DERXW3RPSH\·VLQWHQWLRQVDQGZULWHVWKDWKLV
public disavowal of a dictatorship, about which rumours had evidently been circulating at least 
since June, was inconistent: when asked in privateKHFRXOGQ·WGHQ\ZDQWLQJLW (Pompeius plane 
se negat velle; antea mihi ipse non negabat).17 But here again we need to differentiate between 
the situation in late 54, when a dictatorship was possible in the regular fashion, and that of 53, 
when it was not. 'LR·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI3RPSH\·VPRWLYDWions is highly distinctive; very much 
unlike Appian and Plutarch, he believed that his refusal in 53 was genuine.  
OXUKLVWRULDQ·V YLHZRI3RPSH\·VDWWLWXGH WRD VROHFRQVXOVKLSPD\QRW FRQYLQFH but 
the interpretation of his hopes for a dictatorship in 53 (or rather lack thereof) merits serious 
consideration. The evidence discussed below shows that it was evidently a discredited political 
solution, and anxieties about the office in general³and not only in connection with Pompey³
appear to have been shared by a wider contingent than Cicero alone in 54²53. What we have 
KHUHDSSHDUVWREHDGHOLEHUDWHFKRLFHRQWKHKLVWRULDQ·VSDUWWRGHYLDWHIURPDTXLWHXQLIRUP
WUDGLWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHJHQHUDO·VDPELWLRQVIRUDGLFWDWRUVKLS,WFDQQRWEHGLVFRXQWHGWKDWWKLV
emerges from his use of alternative sources, of course, but this will not bear fruit. For a start, 
the consistency of the extant accounts makes a deviant tradition guesswork: Appian, Cicero, 
and Plutarch all suggest that Pompey had a dictatorship in his sights. Moreover, Dio had access 
to these sources.
18
 He seems to be forming a different interpretation on his own initiative. 
Why make such a radical departure? This chapter proposes that Cassius Dio was 
especially preoccupied with the problematic nature of the Republican dictatorship as an 
exercise of powers. 3RPSH\·VGLVDYRZDORI WKDWRIILFH and the honour he is paid as a result³
which Dio frames uniquely as a genuine and more importantly astute political manoeuvre³is 
only one episode in a much wider exploration of the role played by the dictatorship in the fall 
of the Republic. Dio argues that by the first century BCE the dictatorship had become wholly 
unsuited to the needs of government: it was ineffective in practical terms as well as being 
politically toxic. 3RPSH\·VKDQGOLQJRIWKHFULVLVRI²53 showed his awareness of this fact, and 
so his political acumen; Caesar failed to observe this lesson, with fatal consequences. Yet at the 
same time, the historian firmly believed in the value of autocracy and the stabilising power of 
sole rule in times of upheaval.
19
 The statesmen of the Roman History are thus caught in a 
bizarre paradox, a different ¶FULVLV ZLWKRXW DOWHUQDWLYH·:20 autocracy was needed to save the 
Republic, and yet could no longer operate within the traditional framework. The resolution to 
that paradox was Augustus.  
The first part of this chapter sketches out &DVVLXV'LR·VYLHZRIWKHSURSHUUROHRIWKH
Roman dictatorship, focussing on his commentary on its alleged foundation at the turn of the 
                                                          
16
 Cass. Dio 40.51.1. The contrast between the ƥ੡ƪƫƥƩơ of a voluntary grant of magnificent powers and the ƶƨƼƭƯƲ 
attached to those powers is a paraphrase of Dio·s speeches on the lex Gabinia (36.25.3²26.2), and the antithesis is 
made umpteen times elsewhere.  
17
 Cic. Q. Fr. 3.8.5. 
18
 On Dio and Cicero, see Burden-6WUHYHQV)RUGLVFXVVLRQRI 'LR DQG$SSLDQ VHH *RZLQJ'LR·V
UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK 3OXWDUFK LV OHVV FKDUWHG 0LOODU  EHOLHYHV WKDW UHIHUHQFHV WR 3OXWDUFK DUH =RQDUDV·
interpolation. 
19
 At 44.2.1-5, Cass. Dio VWDWHVJQRPLFDOO\WKDW¶LIHYHU·WKere was a noble ƤƧƬƯƪƱơƴƟơ, it only endured for a short 
time. For this thought see also 30-35 F 110.2. At 53.19.1, he explicitly outlines his view that following the Augustan 
Settlement, the Roman constitution was changed for the better; it was manifestly no longer possible to keep the 
people safe under a ƤƧƬƯƪƱơƴƟơ. For this attitude see Tac. Hist. 1.1.1, 1.16.1; Sen. Ben. 2.20.2; App. B.Civ. 4.133. 
See also Madsen 2016.  
20





 century BCE. Unlike other historians, Dio appears to have emphasised the positive potential 
of dictatorship as a temporary return to monarchy; his earlier books present numerous positive 
and successful examples of dictatorships in Republican history. However, this was not to 
remain. The next SDUWH[SORUHV'LR·VSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHGLFWDWRUVKLSLQD¶VHFRQG·SKDVe, the 
period after Sulla, and shows that the historian problematised this office on both practical and 
moral grounds. He was not the first to do so; contemporary evidence from the 50s suggests the 
dictatorship as such was in disrepute, and not only in connection with Pompey. In that context, 
KLVYLHZRI3RPSH\·VUHIXVDODVJHQXLQHDQGDVWXWHLQPDNHVVHQVHThird and finally, this 
chapter briefly considers DLR·V DFFRXQWRI WKHHDUOLHU \HDUVRI$XJXVWXV· principate in Books 
52²54 and his own rejection of the dictatorship.  
 
 
PHASE ONE: THE IDEAL OF DICTATORSHIP 
 
Let us start at the beginning. Blessed with hindsight, Dio seems to have viewed the inauguration 
of the first dictator Titus Lartius in 501 (or 498) as a moment of great importance.
21
 Pausing his 
QDUUDWLYHRIWKH5HSXEOLF·VHDUO\FRQIOLFWVZLWKWKH6DELQHV'LRdescribes the institution of this 
office as a direct response to military and civic crisis: the indebted plebs, infuriated at their 
treatment by their patrician creditors, refused the draft when called upon to defend the 
Republic against the threat of the Latins, and demanded a cancellation of debts.
22
 Dio then goes 
on to revLHZWKHGLFWDWRU·Vformal powers: the six-month tenure, immunity from provocatio and 
intercession by tribunes, and³a detail absent in our other historians³certain restrictions on his 
right to draw from the treasury and on riding mounted in the city. The surviving text is ZonDUDV·
HSLWRPHQRW'LR·s: although no fragments of this material survive in the direct tradition, we can 




One of the most striking aspects of 'LR·VDFFRQWRI/DUWLXV·DSSRLQWPHQWDVGLFWDWRULVKLV
view of its positive potential. Dio takes pains to stress the beneficial aspects of a temporary 
return to autocracy, especially during periods of instability:  
 
«he possessed power equal in all respects to that of the kings. People hated the 
name of ¶king· on account of the Tarquins, but desiring the benefit to be derived 
from sole leadership, which seemed to exert a potent influence amid conditions of 
war and revolution, they chose it under another name. 
 
This is notably different from the accounts given in both Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. 
In the former, 7LWXV /DUWLXV· DSSRLQWPHQW LV WUHDWHG DV D FDXVH IRU JUHDW DSSUHKHQVLRQ WKH
terrified plebs, hard presVHG ZLWK WKH VLJKW RI /DUWLXV· fasces KDG ¶QR KRSH RI KHOS IURP
another, QRU ULJKW RI DSSHDO QRU DQ\ VDIHW\ DQ\ZKHUH H[FHSW LQ REHGLHQFH·24 The SDWULFLDQV·
rationale for instituting the office is to inspire fear and quell the plebeian struggle temporarily to 
deal with the Sabines and Latins, objectives in which they succeeded. 'LRQ\VLXV· DFFRXQW LV
                                                          
21




This does not concern us here: like all annalists Dio believed the tradition.   
23
 )RU =RQDUDV· IDLWKIXOQHVV WR 'LR VHH PRVW UHFHQtly Fromentin (forthcoming) ZKR VKRZV WKH HSLWRPDWRU·V
method of preserving acts of speech and retaining points of transition between speech and narrative. Simons 2009, 
25²32 RXWOLQHV=RQDUDV·PHWKRGVZLWKWKHQDUUDtive proper. Further in Mallan (forthcoming).    
24
 Liv. 2.18.8: magnus plebem metus incessit, ut intentiores essent ad dicto parendum; neque enim ut in consulibus 




quite different. It is much more pessimistic and takes pains to associate dictatorship with 
monarchy in its degenerate form, tyranny. For Dionysius, the chief reason for a dictatorship 
was, above all (ਫ਼ư੻Ʊ ਚươƭƴơ), the supposed lex Valeria de provocatione: the Senate were 
VHHNLQJ D VSHFLRXV PHFKDQLVP ¶E\ ZKLFK WR GHFHLYH WKH SRRU DQG ZLWKRXW EHLQJ detected, 
UHSHDOWKHODZWKDWVHFXUHGWKHLUOLEHUW\·25 In that vein, the historian describes the dictatorship 
repeatedly as a form of tyranny as such. Dionysius asserts baldly that a such a magistracy, being 
above the law, was a tyranny in fact if not by name:
26
 it is compared directly to emergency 
powers in (for example) Thessaly and Sparta, where tyrannical powers ungoverned by law and 
custom were ¶FRQFHDOHG under more DWWUDFWLYH WLWOHV· (ੑƭƼƬơƳƩ ưƥƱƩƪơƫƽưƴƯƭƴƥƲ ơ੝ƴ੹Ʋ
ƥ੝ưƱƥưƥƳƴƝƱƯƩƲ).27 Viewing the events of 501/498 through the lens of the 1st century BCE, 
Dionysius and to a lesser extent Livy present the dictatorship as a problematic institution from 
its inception.  
'LR·VYLHZRIWKH5HSXEOLFDQGLFWDWRUVKLSLVLQIDFWIDUFORVHUWRCicero·V than to that of 
his fellow-historians. Leaving aside its routine or ritual functions (clavi figendi causa, for 
example, or holding games),
28
 he evidently saw within the dictatorship the positive potential for 
a temporary resort to monarchy in times of crisis. Dio certainly did not wrongly believe (like 
Dionysius) that the dictatura was a form of tyranny by its nature. This is confirmed by his own 
commentary on the lex Antonia of 44 BCE, permanently abolishing that magistracy. He writes 
that the Romans took what they believed to be the best course for the future, as if the disgrace 
RIPHQ·V deeds lay in their titles (੮ƳưƥƱਥƭƴƯ૙ƲੑƭƼƬơƳƩƴોƲƴ૵ƭ਩ƱƣƹƭƤƥƩƭƼƴƧƴƯƲƯ੡ƳƧƲ), when 
in fact³he corrects the statesmen of April 44 on their mistake³the issue was not the 
dictatorship as such, but the combination of military command and a tyrannical character.
29
 In 
other words, for our historian dictatorship was a legitimate mechanism for bringing stability to 
the state, with the temporary reality of monarchy but the necessary illusion of a civilian title. 
:KHWKHU WKLV DVSHFWRI'LR·VSROLWLFDO WKRXJKWZDV LQVSLUHGE\ VRPH LQWHUPHGLDU\ LVXQclear, 
but its earliest (surviving) expression can be found in the Republic. &LFHUR·VFRPPHQWRQWKH
proper role of the dictatorship in the state is most clearly articulated in Book 2: 
 
«DQGMXVWDV7DUTXLQVXEYHUWHGWKHZKROHIDEULFRIUR\DOW\³not because he grasped 
a new sort of authority, but because he made a bad use of it³so let us oppose to 
him another: a good man, wise and expert in everything useful and dignified in civil 
OLIHDWXWRUDQGVWHZDUGDVLWZHUHRIWKHFRPPRQZHDOWK«Tarquin being banished, 
the royal title was as odious to the Roman people as it had been regretted after the 
death or rather the disappearance of Romulus; and as much as they wanted a king 
then, in like manner, after the expulsion of Tarquin, they could not endure the 
name of one«,QWKHVHYHU\WLPHVWRR7/DUFLXVZDVDSSRLQWHGGLFWDWRUDERXWWHQ
years after the first consuls. A new kind of authority, very much resembling, as we 




Now, the Republic is not without its difficulties. The text was written between around 54²51 
BCE, ZKHQ ¶GHPRFUDWLF· LQVWLWXWLRQVKDGHIIHFWLYHO\FROODSVHG; it accordingly presents an ideal, 
not the reality, and this is evidently not a guide to Roman politics in practice. It is significant 
                                                          
25
 D.H. AR 5.70.4: ƪơ੿ ƣƱƜƶƥƩ ưƱƯƢƯƽƫƥƵƬơ, ƤƩૃ Ư੤ ươƱơƪƱƯƵƳơƬƝƭƧ ƴƯઃƲ ưƝƭƧƴơƲ ƪơ੿ ƴઁƭ ƢƥƢơƩƯ૨ƭƴơ ƴ੽ƭ ਥƫƥƵƨƥƱƟơƭ 
ơ੝ƴƯ૙Ʋ ƭƼƬƯƭ ਕƭƥƫƯ૨Ƴơ ਩ƫơƨƥƭ 
26
 D.H. AR ¶WKHH[WHQWRIWKHSRZHUZKLFKthe dictator possesses is by no means indicated by the title; for 
WKH GLFWDWRUVKLS LV LQ UHDOLW\ DQ HOHFWLYH W\UDQQ\· ਥưƥ੿ ƴƼ ƣƥ ƴોƲ ਥƮƯƵƳƟơƲ ƬƝƣƥƨƯƲ, ਸƲ ੒ ƤƩƪƴƜƴƹƱ ਩ƷƥƩ, ਸ਼ƪƩƳƴơ 
ƤƧƫƯ૨ƴơƩ ਫ਼ưઁ ƴƯ૨ ੑƭƼƬơƴƯƲź ਩ƳƴƩ ƣ੹Ʊ ơੂƱƥƴ੽ ƴƵƱơƭƭ੿Ʋ ਲ ƤƩƪƴơƴƯƱƟơ). See also 5.70.5. 
27
 D.H. AR 5.74.1²4. 
28
 On which Lintott 1999, 109ff. 
29
 Cass. Dio 44.51.2-3. 
30
 Cic. Resp. 2.29²32. 
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that Cicero may have been penning this book just when anxieties about a potential dictatorship 
for Pompey were at their height in late 54 and early 53.
31
 Furthermore, there are obvious 
LQFRQVLVWHQFLHVLQ&LFHUR·VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGWKLVPDJLVWUDF\LIZHORRNDWKLVZRUNLQWKHURXQG
Hence in a rare moment of praise for Antonius, the orator lauds his abolition of the 
dictatorship in the lex Antonia , ¶ZKLFKE\WKLVWLPHKDGFRPHWRSRVVHVVNLQJO\SRZHUULSSHG
RXWRI WKH VWDWHE\ LWV URRWV·.32 5HSHDWHGO\KH UHIHUV WR WKH ¶XQLYHUVDOO\ FDWDVWURSKLF dominatio 
and regnum of Sulla LQYLFWRU\·.33 ,QSULYDWHKHZURWHWR&DVVLXVWKDWZLWK&DHVDU·VDVVDVVLQDWLRQ
Rome had been liberated not only from a king (non regno sed rege liberati videmur) but from 
a tyrannus, whose injuries against the Republic had been avenged with his death (ulta suas 
iniurias est per vos interitu tyranni).34 Naturally in that light we need not put too much faith in 
&LFHUR·VSUDLVHRI&DHVDULQWKHPro DeiotaroGHVFULELQJWKHGLFWDWRUDV¶QRWRQO\QRWDW\UDQW
EXWDPRVWPHUFLIXOPDQ·35 It was addressed directly to Caesar himself!  
Nevertheless, all of these critiques are concerned with the reality of the dictatorship in 
the final decades of the res publica as exemplified in its two most controversial holders, Sulla 
and Caesar. What they do not do is simplistically criticise (as Dionysius) the dictatorship in and 
of itself as a tyrannical institution; for were that the case, why persist with it regularly for over 
three hundred years?  In other words, these comments of Cicero are not a general view of the 
dictatorship, but a castigation of its corruption and usurpation by two specific holders. Hence 
for the conception of what this office should be and how it was intended to function under 
usual circumstances, we have the dialogue on the commonwealth. The Republic asserts the 
positive potential of the dictatorship in the mind of a contemporary observer, and in terms that 
DUH UHPDUNDEO\ VLPLODU WR'LR·V ODWHU Both our historian and Cicero note the odium for the 
name of kingship after the expulsion of Tarquin, but emphasise that the Romans of the late 6
th
 
century wanted a king all the same³hence, the dictator. Both also review the scope of the 
GLFWDWRU·VSRZHUVLQSRVLWLYHWHUPV'LRKLJKOLJKWLQJthe SRWHQWLDO¶EHQHILW·of a sole ruler for the 
state in periods of instability and war, and Cicero IRFXVVLQJRQWKHEHQHILWWREHGHULYHGIURP¶D
WXWRU DQG VWHZDUGRI WKH FRPPRQZHDOWK·. In that regard, the role of the ideal statesman, the 
rector rei publicae, can apparently be fulfilled by the dictator appointed in a time of crisis; Dio, 
as a theorist in his own right of Republican institutions and their effect upon the practice of 
politics (see Coudry in this volume), was evidently receptive to this idea.
36
  
Thus from its first appearance in the Roman History Dio seems to have presented the 
Roman dictatorship in a radically different light from our two other main historians of early 
Rome, Dionysius and Livy. Dionysius in particular chose to view that office from its foundation 
through the lens of events in the 1
st
 century BCE; this is plainly wrong and misleading. Our 
historian, in contrast, took a more measured approach. Like Cicero, he viewed the dictatorship 
as a temporary return to monarchical powers in the interests of the state, which was only 
corrupted by the individual ambitions of its most controversial holders³Sulla and Caesar. This, 
to reiterate, explains his commentary on the lex Antonia. The office itself was not the issue:37 
 
But the consuls«SXEOLVKHG a law that no one should ever again be dictator, 
invoking curses and proclaiming death as the penalty upon any man who should 
propose or support such a measure, besides openly setting a price upon the heads 
of any such. This provision they made for the future, assuming that the 
shamefulness of men's deeds consists in the titles they bear, whereas these deeds 
                                                          
31
 Cic. Q. Fr. 2.12.1. 
32
 Cic. Phil. 1.2: dictaturam, quae iam vim regiae potestatis obsederat, funditus ex re publica sustulit. 
33
 Cic. Har. Resp., esp. 54: universus interitus aut victoris dominatus ac regnum. 
34
 Cic. Fam. 12.1.1-2. 
35
 Cic. Deiot. 34. 
36
 )RUGLVFXVVLRQRI&LFHUR·Vrector rei publicae, see Zarecki 2014.  
37
 Cass. Dio 44.51.2-3. 
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really arise from their possession of armed forces and from the character of the 
individual incumbent (੮ƳưƥƱਥƭƴƯ૙ƲੑƭƼƬơƳƩƴોƲƴ૵ƭ਩ƱƣƹƭƤƥƩƭƼƴƧƴƯƲƯ੡ƳƧƲਕƫƫૃ Ư੝ƪਥƪ
ƴ૵ƭ੖ưƫƹƭƪơ੿ ਥƪƴ૵ƭਦƪƜƳƴƯƵƴƱƼưƹƭƪơ੿ ƣƩƣƭƯƬƝƭƹƭơ੝ƴ૵ƭƪơ੿ ƴ੹ƲƴોƲਥƮƯƵƳƟơƲ), and they 




7KH WH[W LV ODFXQRVH DQG HYHQ =RQDUDV· HSLWRPH SUHVHUYHV OLWWOH GHWDLO H[FHSW RQ WKH PRVW
IDPRXV RI 5RPH·s dictators. But the information that survives gives an almost consistently 
SRVLWLYHDFFRXQW7KHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI&LQFLQQDWXV·GLFWDWRUVKLS LVFRQYHQWLRQDO WKHIDUPKDQG
ZKRYDOLDQWO\FUXVKHG6SXULXV0DHOLXV·adfectatio regni, and so forth.38 Zonaras records that in 
272 BCE the former dictator P. Cornelius Rufinus was removed from the senate roll for 
transgressing sumptuary legislation, but this is hardly a reflection on the dictatorship as such.
39
 
Lucius Papirius Cursor (325 & 310?) and Aulus Cornelius Cossus Arvina (322?) are described 
positively in connection with the Samnite wars.
40
 The war with Hannibal is naturally a chance to 
display Roman valour. Fabius Cunctator emerges in particular favour: his strategy is described 
as wise and effective, and it is his impetuous master of horse Rufus, not the delaying dictator, 
who is made the subject of criticism.
41
 The account of 0-XQLXV3HUD·VHIIRUWVWRrescue Rome 
as dictator in 216 is broadly approving, in particular his work to save the beseiged people of 
Basilinae from hunger and his controversial last resort (not criticised by Dio-Zonaras) of 
conscripting even slaves and criminals to face the threat of Hannibal.
42
 Finally, there is M. 
Furius Camillus. Although Dio records anger at his decision to ride on white horses in his 
triumphal procession,
43
 thHUHPDLQLQJGHWDLORI&DPLOOXV·VHYHUDO terms as dictator is laudatory: 
after being betrayed by his countrymen and going into exile, Camillus returns to quell the 
alleged conspiracy of Capitolinus and in a fifth dictatorship defeats the Gauls at the river Anio. 
Following his resignation in the proper term and his death, there was great public grief.
44
 
These few episodes are all that remains of what must originally have been dozens of 
YLJQHWWHVRQ WKHDFWLYLWLHVRI5RPDQGLFWDWRUVEHWZHHQ7/DUWLXV· LQDXJXUDWLRQ and 202 BCE, 
when the office fell out of use. There is nothing here to support the conflation between 
dictatorship and tyranny³monarchy in its degenerate form³which we find in Dionysius. 
,QVWHDG ZKDW ZH ILQG LQ 'LR·V HDUOLHU KLVWRU\ LV D FROOHFWLRQ RI H[DPSOHV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK KLV
vision of the proper role of dictatorship in a functioning Republic: a legitimate and temporary 
return to monarchy in order to stabilise the state in times of desperate need.  
 
 
PHASE TWO: THE DICTATORSHIP IN CRISIS 
 
For Dio the final decades of the libera res publica represented the collapse of that vision. This 
is of course not surprising in view of the experiment with Sulla and Caesar; but the 
disappearance of the dictatorship as a viable exercise of powers in the first century BCE is in fact 
integral to his explanation of the crisis of the Republic and the emergence of $XJXVWXV· UXOH
7KLVGHFOLQHLQWKHGLFWDWRUVKLSIURPDJHQXLQH¶VWHZDUGVKLSRIWKHFRPPRQZHDOWK·LQ&LFHUR·V
words to an unworkable and discredited failure is already alluded to by Dio from its first 
                                                          
38
 Cass. Dio 5 F 23.2, 6 F 20.  
39
 Zon. 8.6.  
40
 Zon. 7.26, Cass. Dio 8 F 36.26.  
41
 Zon. 8.25-26. 
42
 Zon. 9.2. 
43
 Cass. Dio 6 F 21. 
44
 Cass. Dio 6 F 24.4. 
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appearance in the Roman History. To linger a moment longer on the inauguration of T. 




The office of dictator extended for a period of not more than six months, in order 
that no such official by lingering on in the midst of so great power and unhampered 
authority should become haughty and be carried away by a passion for sole 
leadership. This was what happened later to Julius Caesar, when, contrary to lawful 
precedent, he had been adjudged worthy of the dictatorship. 
 
This commentary³LI JHQXLQHO\ 'LR·V³is significant. The historian appears to have used the 
earliest formation of the dictatorship as an opportunity to reflect on the development of the 
office over time and to foreshadow its transformation in the final decades of the Republic. 
There is every possibility that the exemplum of Julius Caesar here is a later interpolation of the 
epitomator. Narrative techniques such as allusion, prolepsis, and analepsis are common in 
'LR·VKLVWRU\EXWWKHVHDUHXVXDOO\far more oblique than this explicit exemplum. Nevertheless, 
exempla are common to DiR·VFRPSRVLWLRQDOWHFKQLTXH³especially of course in the speeches³
and WKH KLVWRULDQ·V SDUWLFXODU LQWHUHVW LQ WKH UROH RI WKH GLFWDWRUVKLS ZLWKLQ WKH 5HSXEOLF·V
permutations would certainly explain WKHFKRLFHWRIRUHVKDGRZ&DHVDU·VFDUHHUDWDQHDUO\VWDJH 
7KHHDUOLHUSRUWLRQVRI'LR·VZRUNSUHVHQWGLFWDWRUVKLSLQLWVSURSHUIRUPDGGXFLQJH[DPSOHV
of the benefit provided to the state by a number of holders; the allusion to Caesar, on the other 
KDQGSRLQWVIRUZDUGWRWKHKLVWRULDQ·VDUJXPHQWDERXWLWVGHJHQHUDWLYHUROH 
That argument at last arrives in explicit terms in Book 36 in the speech of Q. Lutatius 
Catulus. The ostensible rhetorical purpose of the speech is a long dissuasio against the lex 
Gabinia of 67 BCE, which proposed an extraordinary command of three years for an 
unspecified undividual over the entire Mediterranean to combat the threat of piracy. Dio notes 
that, naturally, there was no need for Gabinius as rogator to name Pompey for him to 
immediately spring to mind as the ideal candidate for the piratical command. But in truth³and 
as Marianne Coudry has correctly shown³the piratical menace is of little importance LQ'LR·V
staging of the debate. TKHKLVWRULDQ·VDFWXDOSXUSRVHLVWRXVHWKis setting as the springboard for 
an extended discussion of Republican politics, reflecting upon the corruption of political life 
and the state of the constitution in the wake of Sulla.
46
 It is in that context that we must place 
&DWXOXV·FRPPHQWVRQWKHGLFWDWRUVKLSDQGFDQPDNHVHQVHRIWKHP$IWHUKLVexordium'LR·V
Catulus begins by criticising extended periods of command as illegal and corrosive to the res 
publica: no individual can abide by ancestral customs, such as collegiality and healthy 
competition for status, if entrusted with repeated positions of power.
47
  This, Dio argues, was 
precisely the problem with Marius and then Sulla: the latter EHFDPH¶ZKDWKHZDV·as a result of 
successive periods of command, first of armies in the field and then as dictator and consul.  
Interestingly, Catulus then reviews other possibilities: why give an extraordinary and 
unconstitutional command to Pompey rather than relying on existing consuls and praetors? 
Alternatively, Catulus argues, the dictatorship might even  be used to resolve the menace of 
Mediterranean piracy. The passage is revealing, and worth quoting in full:
 48
   
 
But if it is indeed necessary to elect an official alongside the yearly magistrates, there 
is already an ancient precedent, that is, the dictator. However, our ancestors did not 
establish this office for every circumstance, nor for a period longer than six months. 
Therefore, if you do require such an official, it is possible for you to engage either 
                                                          
45
 Zon. 7.13. 
46
 Coudry 2016. 
47
 Cass. Dio 36.31.3-4. 
48
 Cass. Dio. 36.34. 
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Pompeius or any other man as dictator without transgressing the law nor failing to 
deliberate carefully for the common good³on the condition that this be for no 
longer than the allotted time nor outside of Italy (ਥƶૃ મ Ƭƞƴƥ ưƫƥƟƹ ƴƯ૨ ƴƥƴơƣƬƝƭƯƵ 
ƷƱƼƭƯƭ Ƭƞƴƥ ਩Ʈƹ ƴોƲ ੉ƴơƫƟơƲ ਙƱƮૉ). For you are not unaware, I think, that our 
ancestors zealously preserved this limitation, and that no dictator can be found who 
served abroad, aside from one who went to Sicily and achieved nothing. But if Italy 
requires no such person, and if you cannot bear not only the function of a dictator 
but even the name³as is clear from your anger against Sulla³(Ư੡ƴૃ ਗƭ ਫ਼Ƭƥ૙Ʋ 
ਫ਼ưƯƬƥƟƭơƩƴƥ ਩ƴƩ Ư੝Ʒ ੖ƴƩ ƴઁ ਩ƱƣƯƭ ƴƯ૨ ƤƩƪƴƜƴƯƱƯƲ ਕƫƫૃ Ư੝Ƥ੻ ƴઁ ੕ƭƯƬơ ƤોƫƯƭ Ƥ੻ ਥƮ ੰƭ 
ưƱઁƲ ƴઁƭ Ɠƽƫƫơƭ ਱ƣơƭơƪƴƞƳơƴƥ) how could it be right to create a new position of 
authority over practically everything within Italy and outside it for three years? You 
all know what horrors come to states from such a course, and how many have often 
disturbed our people because of their lust for extra-legal powe  (੖ƳƯƩ ƤƩ੹ ƴ੹Ʋ 
ươƱơƭƼƬƯƵƲ ƶƩƫơƱƷƟơƲ ƴƼƭ ƴƥ ƤોƬƯƭ ਲƬ૵ƭ ưƯƫƫƜƪƩƲ ਥƴƜƱơƮơƭ) and have brought 
innumerable evils upon themselves. 
 
$W ILUVW JODQFH WKHVH FRPPHQWV RI 'LR·V VSHDNHU PDNH OLWWOH ORJLFDO VHQVH :DV WKH KLVWRULDQ
incompetent?
49
 In order to combat the threat of piracy across the Mediterranean³a complex 
military operation over a wide geographical area³Catulus proposes a dictatorship which is by its 
nature restricted. The dictator must not leave Italy, and should resign within six months as have 
all dictators hitherto.
50
 Moreover, these severe limitations are enumerated by the speaker 
himself. In other words, &DWXOXV·VXJJHVWLRQLVZLWKRXWZRUWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRI.  
But Dio is not using Catulus to propose a genuinely workable alternative to an 
extraordinary command for Pompey. Rather, this interjection from Catulus is used to illustrate 
clearly by example that in a world empire, Romans of the Late Republic had little choice but to 
resort to dangerous extraordinary commands. Evidently³as Catulus shows³the dictatorship was 
wholly unsuitable as an emergency magistracy to address the exigencies of a large empire. The 
historian absolutely (and rightly) recognised that extended periods of command were corrosive 
to Republican traditions, engendering autocratic ambitions in those who received them; this is 
stated flatly by Catulus at the end of the excerpt.
51
  Yet crises occurred within a Republican 
empire just as in all empires: who could be tasked to address them if not the regular 
magistrates, limited by an impractical one-year term, or the dictator, limited by even more 
stringent restrictions? So far from dissuading the Quirites IURP FKRRVLQJ 3RPSH\ 'LR·V
Catulus merely reiterates that the existing framework furnished few other options. Dio clearly 
EHOLHYHGWKDW¶GHPRFUDWLF·HPSLUHVZHUHLPPRGHUDWHDQGVXsceptible to stasis; he says himself 
that the scope of the empire required a capable autocrat to guide it.
 52 
 Within the framework of 
traditional liberty, this individual was the dictator³¶DUXOHU XQGHUDQRWKHUQDPH·LQ&LFHUR·VDQG
ODWHU'LR·VGHILQLWLRQ³yet this was no longer a practical option.  
                                                          
49
 Evidently not; the oblique reference to an unsuccessful dictator in Sicily is Aulus Calatinus (see Cass. Dio 12. F 
15), dictator in 249 BCE. Obviously Dio had done his research to insert this rather neat historical detail, and the 
recall suggests hypomnemata of particularly high quality.  
50
 Hinard 1999 suggests that this excerpt from the dissuasio of Catulus proves that Sulla resigned his dictatorship 
within the proper six-month term, possibly in time for the consular elections in July 81 for the following year.    
51
 This is the phenomenon termed by Suetonius imperii consuetudo RU¶KDELWRIFRPPDQGLQJ·WKHSV\FKRORJLFDO
impact of extended periods of command, especially within the provinces, where poor communication and patchy 
senatorial oversight allowed the provincial governor essentially to rule alone in a far-flung corner of the empire. 
The best treatment of this is Eckstein 2004; for the thought of Dio on the destructive impact of imperii 
consuetudo in the Republic, see Burden-Strevens 2016.  
52




It may not have been a morally appealing one either. Dio uses this speech to make a 
clever inversion of his first comments on the foundation of the dictatorship: desiring the 
EHQHILFLDODVSHFWVRIDPRQDUFK\WKH5RPDQVLQWKHZDNHRI7DUTXLQRULJLQDOO\¶FKRVHLWXQGHU
anRWKHUQDPH·%XWLQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKH6XOODQH[SHULPHQWLWLVWKHQDPHRIdictatura, not 
monarchy, that the Romans cannot stomach. Now, having Q. Lutatius Catulus (the younger) 
advance the view that the Quirites ¶cannot bear not only the function of a dictator but even the 
name· after Sulla is TXHVWLRQDEOH )RU D VWDUW WKH VSHDNHU·V RZQ IDWKHU KDG VLGHG ZLWK 6XOOD
committing suicide rather than face Marius following the ODWWHU·V RFFXSDWLRQ RI 5RPH DQG
Catulus himself argued for the retention of the Sullan constitution during his consulship and an 
honourable burial upon his death.
53
 He is not the most credible candidate to articulate these 
views of Dio. Melissa Barden Dowling has also suggested that there is no evidence that Sulla 
had yet entered political discourse as a negative exemplum by the time of this debate in 67 
BCE, particularly in connection with cruelty or crudelitas; our earliest such citation seems to 
come in the late 60s at In Catilinam 3.10.54 But in fact these themes seem to have been 
explored as early as 80 BCE in the Pro Roscio, albeit with only oblique reference to Sulla (for 
obvious reasons).
55
 Cicero mentions the recent dictator in revealingly fawning terms³¶WKDWPRVW
JDOODQWDQGLOOXVWULRXVPDQZKRP,RQO\QDPHWRKRQRXU·³56and directs his criticism toward his 
client and freedman Chrysogonus. But the disease of crudelitas is described in the peroration 
as endemic to the entire Republic and (significantly) as a recent phenomenon, ¶KDYLQJ WDNHQ
clemency away from the hearts of HYHQPHUFLIXOPHQ·57 We are hard pressed not to think of 
Sulla, QRW OHDVWEHFDXVHKLVQDPHLVPHQWLRQHGDOPRVWDVPXFKDV&KU\VRJRQXV·³consistently 
either in extravagant rehearsal of the many reasons for which he could not possibly have been 
aware of his FOLHQW·VDFWLRQVRU in the adulation which speaks of fear.58 
Dio thus problematises the dictatorship in the Late Republic on two bases in the 
dissuasio of Catulus. Firstly, there is a practical consideration: D¶FLW\ZKLFKUXOHVWKHZRUOG·LQ
'LR·VZRUGV could not be governed democratically, and the demands of crisis within a wide 
empire necessarily required temporary returns to autocracy. Yet the conventional mechanism 
for such emergency measures³dictatorship³was not legally permissable within the existing 
framework, necessitating prolonged and corrosive periods of command. To my knowledge Dio 
is our only historian of this period to have given the dictatorship serious consideration in the 
failure of the Republic to manage its empire and as a practical justification IRU$XJXVWXV·UXOH. 
Secondly, there were moral concerns. If we give the words of Catulus any credence as a 
genuine attempt by the historian to portray his view of what people were thinking about 
dictatorship in the wake of Sulla³and allusions in the Pro Roscio might perhaps suggest an 
early origin for that kind of thought³then evidently Dio wished to argue that the dictatorship 
had come to be viewed as a toxic political solution. I have argued elsewhere that the set-piece 
orations, such as that of Catulus here, are the essential interpretative kernel of the Roman 
History.59 The choice to explore these two problems with the dictatorship³practical and 
reputational³thorugh a set-SLHFHVSHHFKLVHQWLUHO\'LR·s own. The office is unmentioned in his 
                                                          
53
 Q. Lutatius Catulus Major, suicide: Cic. Or. 3.9, Brut. 307, Tusc. 5.56; Diod. 38.4.2-3; Vell. Pat. 2.22.3-4; Val. 
Max 9.12.4; Plut. Mar. 44.8; App. B.Civ. 1.74. Q. Lutatius Catulus Minor, consulship: Sall. Hist. 1.47-48; App. B. 
Civ. 1.105. 
54
 Barden Dowling 2000.  
55
 I am indebted to Prof. Catherine Steel (Glasgow) for bringing this to my attention.  
56
 Cic. Rosc. 6. 
57
 Cic. Rosc. 154.  
58
 E.g. Cic. Rosc. 6, 21-22, 25-26, 110, 127, 130-131, 136, 143. 
59
 Burden-Strevens 2015. It has at least long EHHQUHFRJQLVHGWKDWWKHVSHHFKHVDUHDZLQGRZLQWR'LR·VWKRXJKWIRU
which see Millar 1964, 79. CULWLFLVPVRI'LR·VWHQGHQF\WRZDUG¶PRUDOLVLQJ·LQWKHVSHHFKHVZKRVHPRUDOV"are 
often vague, e.g. Saylor Rogers 2006.   
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VRXUFHIRUWKHPDLQDUJXPHQWVRI&DWXOXV·RUDWLRQ60 and indeed in all parallel sources for the 
lex Gabinia of 67 BCE and the lex Manilia of the following year. 61 Unprompted by an 
intermediary, Cassius Dio wished to problematise the dictatorship at this point because he 
considered it historically important DWWKLV¶WXUQLQJ-SRLQW·LQWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH/DWH5HSXEOLF.62  
Did contemporary Romans share these anxieties? Gianpaolo Urso has argued that the 
¶P\WK RI 6XOOD· LV LQ IDFW DQ ,PSHULal phenomenon: there is no reason to suppose that the 
dictatorship had seriously come under scrutiny at this point in the Late Republic, especially if, 
with Francois Hinard, we accept that the dictator resigned appropriately within the six-month 
term.
63
 But Dio suggests differently, and contemporary evidence may support his claim. Let us 
return to the electoral crisis of 54-53 BCE&LFHUR·VOHWWHUV,KDYHDOUHDG\PHQWLRQHGEULHIO\DVD
source for the main events, although their interest for us here lies in their value as a source for 
attitudes. The letters to Quintus and Atticus between June and December 54 BCE suggest a 
growing atmosphere of suspicion and concern about rumours of a dictatorship, and these 
anxieties appear to be shared by a wider group than the orator alone. On June 3 Cicero writes 
WR 4XLQWXV RI ¶VRPH ODWHQW LGHD RI D GLFWDWRUVKLS· erat aliqua suspicio dictaturae); but the 
rumours were unconfirmed, and in any case hopes for the resumption of proper comitia 
perhaps remained.
64
 By late October this hope was withering and the possibility of an 
interregnum DURVHLQWKDWFRQWH[W&LFHURVSHDNVWR$WWLFXVRI¶DZKLIIRIGLFWDWRUVKLSLQWKHDLU
LQIDFWDJRRGGHDORIWDONDERXWLW·est non nullus odor dictaturae, sermo quidem multus). 65 In 
other letters from late October the tone is more panicked: &LFHURSXWV*DELQLXV·DFTXLWWDO in 
his trial for maiestas GRZQ WR WKH ¶IHDU-LQGXFLQJ UXPRXU RI D GLFWDWRUVKLS· dictaturae etiam 
rumor plenus timoris).66 Come November, Pompey seems to have been finally mentioned in 
explicit connection with such plans; it is only at this point at least that Cicero mentions his 
name. &LFHUR·V FODLP WKDW ¶WKH UXPRXU RI D GLFWDWRUVKLS LV QRW SOHDVLQJ WR boni· rumor 
dictatoris iniucundus bonis) stresses questionable uniformity of opinion among a group to 
which he so often claimed to belong, although the difference in atmosphere is telling compared 
WR-XQH ¶WKHSURSRVDODVDZKROH LV ORRNHGXSRQZLWKDODUPDQGJURZVXQSRSXODU«WKHUH LV
nRWKLQJHOVHEHLQJWDONHGDERXWLQSROLWLFVMXVWQRZDWDQ\UDWHQRWKLQJHOVHLVEHLQJGRQH·sed 
WRWDUHVHWWLPHWXUHWUHIULJHVFLW« aliud hoc tempore de re publica nihil loquebantur; agebatur 
quidem certe nihil).67 Finally, by December plans for a dictatorship for Pompey had definitely 
taken VKDSH ¶$SSLXV LV LQWULJXLQJ GDUNO\ +LUUXV LV SDYLQJ WKH ZD\· Hirrus parat). Although 
Cicero notes indifference on the part of the people, it is the boni who again are alarmed at the 
prospect (populus non curat, principes nolunt).68 
One possible way of approaching this material is to consider it not as evidence of 
alarmed attitudes toward the dictatorship as such in the 50s, but rather as a reflection on 
Pompey. This is a false dichotomy³it seems to me concerned with both³and in any case does 
not explain the reaction to rumours of a dictatorship between the early and late summer 54 
which do not seem to have been iQFRQQHFWLRQZLWK3RPSH\·VQDPH69 ,Q&LFHUR·VIXOVRPHDQG
QHJDWLYH DFFRXQWV RI 3RPSH\·V SROLWLFDO DFWLYLWLHV WKURXJKRXW WKH VXPPHU LQ KLV HSLVWOHV WR
                                                          
60
 Montecalvo 2014, 24-57 has shown WKDWWKHKLVWRULDQGUHZWKHPDLQDUJXPHQWVRI&DWXOXV·VSHHFKIURPWKHde 
Lege Manilia, where CicHURUHSRUWV&DWXOXV·DQG+RUWHQVLXV·objections to 3RPSH\·VSRZHU)RUIXUWKHUH[DPSOHV 
and a more assertive insistence that the historian was using the orator directly, see Burden-Strevens 2018.  
61
 e.g. App. Mtih. 91-97; Plut. Pomp. 25.10; Sall. Hist. 5.20²24M: Val. Max. 8.15.9; Vell. Pat. 2.32.1²3. 
62
 So described by Coudry 2016. 
63
 Hinard 1999, rejected by Ramsey 2016 310 n. 44; Urso 2016.  
64
 Cic. Q. Fr. 2.13.5. 
65
 Cic. Q. Att. 4.18.3. 
66
 Cic. Q. Fr. 3.4.1. 
67
 Cic. Q. Fr. 3.8.4-6. 
68
 Cic. Q. Fr. 3.9.3. 
69
 So Cic. Att. 4.18.3, Q. Fr. 3.4.1. 
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Quintus and Atticus, all manner of infractions are recorded.
70
 <HW3RPSH\·VQDPHLVQRZKHUH
in connection with a possible dictatorship until November; all Cicero records prior to that, 
possibly in June and certainly by October, is fearful rumours of a possible nomination. Given 
&LFHUR·VGLVWDVWHIRUMagnus noster in the letters of this period and the detail he provides on his 
activities, the absence of his name is surprising. I would (cautiously) suggest that Pompey was 
not at the centre of rumours of a possible dictatorship until late in the year; Plutarch and Dio 
date WKLV DV ODWH DV&/XFLOLXV +LUUXV· HOHFWLRQ WR WKH WULEXQDWH LQ'HFHPEHU, but this is too 
late.
71
 The anxiety perhaps in June and certainly October is about a dictatorship as such, and 
not only Pompey.   
Relying solely on Cicero for this picture is perilous, but can fortunately be 
supplemented. The evidence of coinage is controversial, but remarkably under-studied in 
connection with contemporary attitudes to the dictatorship, and never in conversation with 
'LR·VKLVWRU\72 Like the letters, the numismatic material can be revealing of the opinions not 
only of their producer but also of messages he expected those who mattered to accept. If we 
ZLVKWRJDXJHWKHYHUDFLW\RI'LR·VYLHZWKDWWKHGLFWDWRUVKLSper se had become politically toxic 
in the Late Republic then three denarii from the 50s are of especial interest. The first we turn 
to is certainly the latest and easiest to date, minted shortly after the consuls for 53 finally 
entered office in the summer. The moneyer is M. Valerius Messalla,
73
 son of the newly-elected 
consul Messalla Rufus.  The obverse is perfectly conventional, hence the obverse legend 
(MESSAL·F) right and downwards of the helmeted head of Roma. But the reverse is 
extraordinary. Two curule chairs, flanked by Sǜ C·  (SENATV CONSVLTO) on either side, 
celebrate the successful resumption of Republican magistracies and senatorial integrity: this 
message is reinforced with PATREǜCOS above. Beneath there lies (probably) a horizontal 
sceptre and certainly a diadem, a circular strip of fabric with a knot and two tails: the 
characteristic trapping of Hellenistic kingship.
74
 The choice of images is deliberate and 
significant: the proper framework of regular magistracies triumphs over tyrannical regnum³or, 
in a Republican context, over recently thwarted plans for a dictatorship. ,Q&UDZIRUG·VZRUGV
the reverse type ¶portrays the subjection of the attributes of royalty to that of Republican 
legality; it reflects the (temporary) exclusion of Pompey from the possibility of achieving sole 
UXOH·75 This was not the first time that Pompey was compared to a Hellenistic king: in 56 BCE 
the aedile Favonius quipped, upon seeing a white bandage attached to his leg, that it made little 
difference where on his body the diadem sat.
76
 Although the trappings of the Hellenistic king 
DUH QRW FDWHJRULFDOO\ ¶W\UDQQLFDO·³Classical tyranny is an ethical, not iconographical, 
phenomenon³Republican political invective does not recognise that distinction. A Roman 
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 Cic. Att. 4.15 (27 July), Q. Fr. 3.1 (28 September), 3.2 (October), 3.3 (October), 3.4 (24 October). 
71
 Plut. Pomp. 54.2; Cass. Dio 40.45.5. 
72
 To my knowledge only one Republican coin is ever discussed in connection with the Roman History: the 
famous silver denarius of Brutus of the EID MAR type, mentioned at Cass. Dio 47.25 (RRC 502/4). See Cahn 1988 
211-232 for a more recent die study of the issue. 
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 On his post as triumvir monetalis in this year, see Syme 1986, 228.  
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 On the diadem, see Carson 1957, 50-52 and Rawson 1975, 150. Scepticism that the reverse type portrays a 
diadem is peculiar: for roughly contemporary Roman types one need only compare with RRC 507/2 or for 
genuine Hellenistic examples the diademed heads of Philip V (e.g. SNG München 1124, SNG Alpha Bank 1049, 
AMNG III 2). 
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 Crawford 1974, 457.  
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Fig. 1: Republican denarius, 53 BCE (RRC 435/1) 
 
Here we should remember the disagreement between our literary sources. We have already 
seen that Appian, Plutarch, and Cicero all suggest that Pompey was manoeuvring deliberately 
toward a dictatorship; his plans were only thwarted by Cato and Bibulus.
77
 But Cassius Dio 
maintains that he voluntarily declined it and took pains to get consuls elected for 53³¶VLQFHLQ
UHPHPEUDQFHRI6XOOD·VFUXHOW\DOOKDWHG WKDWRIILFH·.78 0HVVDOOD·Vdenarius does seem to sit ill 
ZLWK 'LR·V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI 3RPSH\·s motivations³evidently a broader contingent than only 
&LFHURZHUHFRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHJHQHUDO·s plans. But at the same time, it supports his overall 
YLHZ DERXW FRQWHPSRUDU\ DWWLWXGHV WR WKH GLFWDWRUVKLS DQG VR HPSKDVLVHV 3RPSH\·V SROLWLFDO
acumen in refusing the office. We have to remember that controversial and (to many) alarming 
plans for a dictatorship have just been scotched. The choice of images³the sceptre and diadem 
of a Hellenistic king, subordinated by the symbols of consular and senatorial authority³needs 
to be interpreted in that context. Andreas Kalyvas has argued that it is our Greek historians of 
the Republic, Dionysius and Appian, who first conceived of a relationship between the Roman 
dictatorship and Greek tyranny: they began a trend for critiquing the dictatorship using words 
and concepts borrowed from the Greek tradition.
79
  This development in fact has earlier roots: 
this language is certainly identifiable in the events of 53 BCE, and it is Roman statesmen³not 
Greek historians³who were using that language.  
The message of consular legitimacy in opposition to tyrannical rule appears in other 
numismatic evidence from the 50s. This may, or may not, be in connection with the electoral 
crisis and rumours of a dictatorship, depending on how we date the material. The coinage of 
M. Brutus furnishes some particularly well-known types. In the first, the obverse displays a 
personification of Libertas, right-facing with the legend downward and behind (LIBERTAS). The 
reverse features a procession of four individuals: the second and fourth in the quartet are 
evidently lictors carrying fasces, flanking a slightly larger figure on either side. The identification 
of this larger figure as L. Junius Brutus, the first Roman consul after the alleged expulsion of 
the Tarquins, is aided by the text in exergue: BRVTVS, identifying both the minter of the coin 
and the subject of the reverse type. The general themes and the interaction between those 
themes are quite clear: the eradication of tyranny from the state and its replacement by the 
Republican magistracies, especially the consulship, standing as the guarantee of libertas (or at 
least an optimate interpretation of it).
80
 These messages are replicated in a second well-known 
LVVXH IURP WKH \HDU RI %UXWXV· PRQH\HUVKLS: L. Junius Brutus returns again on the obverse, 
right-facing with the legend BRVTVS downward and behind; the reverse features a portrait of P. 
Servilius Ahala, who in Republican mytho-history killed Sp. Maelius in 439 BCE to prevent his 
attempt to seize power.  
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 App. B.Civ. 2.23.1; Plut. Pomp. 54.3; Cic. Q. Fr. 3.8.5. 
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 Cass. Dio 40.46, 40.50. 
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 Kalyvas 2007. Particularly important passages are App. B.Civ. 1.99, 1.101 and D.H. AR 5.70, 5.73. 
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Fig. 2: Republican denarius, 54 BCE? (RRC 433/1)  Fig. 3: Republican denarius, 54 BCE? (RRC 433/2) 
 
7KH WKHPHV SUHVHQW LQ %UXWXV· FRLQDJH DUHRI FRXUVH HVSHFLDOO\ UHOHYDQW to 54-53, where the 
collapse of the consular elections left the way open for a dictatorship that many³not only 
Cicero³seem to have feared. The allusion to L. Junius Brutus, the expulsion of the Tarquins, 
and the institution of the consulship are telling in this context. However, the dating and 
interpretation of these coins is a subject of much debate. Michael Crawford suggests 54 BCE, 
YLHZLQJ WKHVH LVVXHV DV DV ¶part of a pattern of consistent opposition to Pompey's real or 
supposed intentions of achieving VROHUXOH·;  Matthew Rockman among others has retained this 
dating and interpretation on the basis of events in that year.
81
 But an alternative view is that 
%UXWXV· WHUP DV triumvir monetalis occurred a year earlier than previously thought and that 
these issues therefore date to 55 BCE, before the electoral and dictatorship débacle.
82
 This 
argument is persuasive, although Cerutti goes too far in radically claiming that %UXWXV· sole 
intention in minting these coins was to advertise his family lineage and that they are silent on 
political events.
83
 There is no room here to wade into this debate. But evidently these issues, 
which were produced some time in the 50s in or before 54 BCE, evince a distinct range of 
political concerns: anxieties about tyranny and adfectatio regni, concern for the proper 
functioning of Republican magistracies, and arguments for the protection of traditional liberty.  
The analysis that Dio offers, through Catulus, of the problem with the dictatorship in 
the final decades of the Republic is intriguing. He believed that the Quirites of this period had 
grown averse WR WKH GLFWDWRUVKLS DV D WR[LF DQG GLVFUHGLWHG SROLWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQ )RU D ¶OLYLQJ·
articulation of that view in a specific context he used Catulus in Book 36³though of course Dio 
makes clear in his own commentary on the lex Antonia that the office itself was not 
problematic, merely the perception of it. In Dio³and indeed, only in Dio³does Pompey seem 
aware of these problems, and accounts for them in his decision to decline the honour. This 
interpretation merits our consideration for three reasons. Firstly, Dio was right. Contemporary 
evidence testifies to the atmosphere of anxiety in 54 surrounding plans for a dictatorship, and 
WKHHDUOLHUH[DPSOHV VXFKDV&LFHUR·V OHWWHUV IURP-XQHDQG2FWREHUmay suggest that those 
anxieties were directed toward a dictatorship as such rather than merely toward Pompey. 
Secondly, Dio is to my knowledge unique in considering the practical limitations of the 
dictatorship as a causal factor in the proliferation of extraordinary commands that were 
corrosive to Republican traditions. Why else insert this point in the debates surrounding the lex 
Gabinia of 67 BCEZKLFKVHHPVZKROO\LUUHOHYDQWRWKHUZLVH",Q'LR·VYLHZDWOHDVWthe Quirites 
had no other choice than Pompey for precisely the reasons his Catulus outlines. Third and 
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 Crawford 1974, 455; Rockman 1992, 14; also Hersh & Walker 1984 and De Rose Evans 1992, 146; the latter 
with a revised date of 59 BCE. The chronology of the coin hoards provided by Cerutti 1993, 71-72 shows that these 
issues must have been minted no later than 54 BCE.  
82
 Cerutti 1993 passim.  
83
 Pace Cerutti 1993, ´WKHUHLVQRHYLGHQFHWRVXSSRUWWKHFODLPWKDW%UXWXV
VWZRFRLQW\SHVZHUHLQWHQGHGWR
DOOXGHWRDQ\WKLQJPRUHWKDQKLVDQFHVWRUV
KLVWRULFDODFKLHYHPHQWVµ   
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ILQDOO\RXUKLVWRULDQ·VFULWLTXHRIWKHGLFWDWRUVKLSis an important part of his explanation of and 
MXVWLILFDWLRQIRU$XJXVWXV·UXOH$QGIRUWKDWZHPXVWWXUQWRVRPHILQDOFRPPHQWV  
 
THE FINAL PHASE: FINDING A REPLACEMENT 
 
In 22 BCE a period of pestilence and famine struck Rome, five years after the Augustan 
¶6HWWOHPHQW· ODYLVKO\ GHWDLOHG LQ %RRNV -53. According to Dio the starving plebs were 
convinced that the only answer to the crisis was to beg Augustus to assume the dictatorship and 
the cura annonae: both of these had been abolished as unconstitutional within a single year two 
decades previously. After shutting up the Senate in the curia and (allegedly) threatening to burn 
it down³DUHFXUULQJIRUPXODLQ'LR·VKLVWRU\84³the people presented their demands:85    
 
They took the twenty-four fasces and approached Augustus, begging him to consent 
to be made dictator as well as curator of the grain-supply, just as Pompey had once 
done (ƪơƨƜưƥƱ ưƯƴ੻ ƴઁƭ ƑƯƬưƞƩƯƭ). Under compulsion he accepted the latter of 
these, and ordered that two men be chosen each year from among those who had 
served as praetors at least five years previously, so as to see to the distribution of 
grain.  But he did not accept the dictatorship (ƴ੽ƭ Ƥ੻ ƤƩƪƴơƴƯƱƟơƭƯ੝ ưƱƯƳƞƪơƴƯ), 
and indeed rent his clothes when he could find no way of convincing the people 
otherwise, either by argument or begging. For as he already had power and honour 
in excess of the dictators anyway, he rightly guarded against the envy and hatred that 
title would bring (ƴƞƭƴƥƣ੹ƱਥƮƯƵƳƟơƭƪơ੿ ƴ੽ƭƴƩƬ੽ƭƪơ੿ ਫ਼ư੻ƱƴƯઃƲƤƩƪƴƜƴƯƱơƲ਩Ʒƹƭ
ੑƱƨ૵ƲƴƼƴƥਥưƟƶƨƯƭƯƭƪơ੿ ƴઁ ƬƩƳƧƴઁƭƴોƲਥưƩƪƫƞƳƥƹƲơ੝ƴ૵ƭਥƶƵƫƜƮơƴƯ).86 
 
'LR·VLVWKHPRVWGHWDLOHGDFFRXQWWKDWZHKDYHRIWKLVLQFLGHQW6XHWRQLXVJLYHVa short sentence 
stating the basic facts;
87
 Velleius Paterculus provides the same information in a fawning one-
liner.
88
 Augustus also briefly records the event himself: tellingly, he considered his public 
disavowal of a dictatorship one of his many proud distinctions.
89
 But our historian is much 
fuller. He used this moment not only (like the Res Gestae) to emphasise Augustus· civilitas and 
refusal to aggrandise himself with further honours, but also emphasises its constitutional 
significance. 'LR·V princeps had no need of a dictatorship, since his power and honour 
surprassed it already; and he recognised³correctly (ੑƱƨ૵Ʋ)³that the office would only serve to 
tarnish his reputation and bring him into suspicion. In other words, the historian partly 
interprets $XJXVWXV· VXFFHVV LQ PDQDJLQJ KLV FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LPDJH through the lens of the 
dictatorship. We are reminded of the IRUHVKDGRZLQJRI&DHVDU LQ WKHKLVWRULDQ·V commentary 
on the earliest foundation of that office; 'LR·V$XJXVWXVGRHVQRWUHSHDW&DHVDU·s mistake.  
)RU 'LR WKLV PLVWDNH ZDV QRW RQH RI WKH UHDOLW\ RI &DHVDU·V SRZHU EXW UDWKHU LWV
presentation. The historian KLPVHOIFOHDUO\GLGQRWEHOLHYHWKDW&DHVDU·VUXOHZDVW\UDQQLFDO)DU
from it: he writes that those who plotted against him were motivated not by his faults, but from 
IHDUWKDWKLV¶JRRGQHVV·  (ƴ੽ƭƷƱƧƳƴƼƴƧƴơơ੝ƴƯ૨) would not last.90 His generosity and clemency 
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 Libourel 1974.  
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 Cass. Dio 54.2.1-5 for the entire narrative of the episode.  
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 1RWH WKH VLPLODULW\ EHWZHHQ WKLV ILQDO LGHD DQG 3RPSH\·V DWWLWXGH WR WKH FRQVXOVKLS sine collega at Cass. Dio 
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 Suet. Aug. 52. 
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 Vell. Pat. 2.89.5. 
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 Aug. RG 5.  
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 Cass. Dio 42.27.4. 
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SXW 6XOOD·V FUXHOW\ WR shame.91 7KH GLFWDWRU ZDV LQ 'LR·V SUHVHQWDWLRQ D VFKHPLQJ YXOWXUH
pleonectic and wastrel at the same time, who absolutely aspired to kingship.
92
 But he was no 
tyrant. 1HYHUWKHOHVV 'LR·V &DHVDU IDLOV WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH importance of appearances. He 
adopted the attire of the ancient kings of Alba, and a golden chair and crown set with jewels was 
to be carried into theatres, among other honours.
93
 He allowed himself to grow conceited and 
puffed-up³DQGWKLVLQ'LR·VYLHZLVSUHFLVHO\ZKDWKLVHQHPLHVZDQWHG¶WKHPDMRULW\ followed 
this course because they wished to make him envied and hated as quickly as possible, that he 
might the sooner perish·94 
Augustus made no such error. His refusal of the dictatorship reiterates his political 
acumen: he is made to recognise the importance of the terms with which power is defined. 
1DWXUDOO\WKDWRI¶GLFWDWRU·KDGEHFRPHFRPSOHWHO\XQSDODWDEOH. :HKDYHVHHQ'LR·VDUJXPHQW
that it had in fact been so for many years, long before Caesar mistakenly adopted it; it was 
neither a practical nor attractive solution to the crisis surrounding the lex Gabinia, for example. 
Yet Dio believed that monarchy was absolutely essential for any stable state. When dictatorship 
failed, the libera res publica IDLOHG 5RPH·V UHFRXUVH WR D WHPSRUDU\ PRQDUFK\ had to be 
replaced. 7KHDQVZHUOD\LQ2FWDYLDQ·VUHELUWKDV¶$XJXVWXV·DQGprinceps: a position of power 
JUHDWHU WKDQ WKH GLFWDWRU·V ZKLFK HVFKHZHG WKH ¶HQY\ DQG KDWUHG WKH WLWOH ZRXOG EULQJ· ƴƼ ƴƥ
ਥưƟƶƨƯƭƯƭ ƪơ੿ ƴઁ ƬƩƳƧƴઁƭ ƴોƲਥưƩƪƫƞƳƥƹƲơ੝ƴ૵ƭ).95 In reinventing the role of monarchy within 
the state³a monarchy under a civil guise³and rejecting the discredited position of dictator, 
'LR·V $XJXVWXV LV LQ IDFW IROORZLQJ WKH DGYLFH RI 0DHFHQDV LQ %RRN  ZKLFK explains the 
KLVWRULDQ·VYLHZLQH[SOLFLWWHUPV96 
 
If you really do desire the reality of monarchy but fear the name of it as an accursed 
thing, WKHQGHFOLQHWKHWLWOHRI¶NLQJ·DQGUXOHDORQHXQGHUWKHWLWOHRI¶&DHVDU·%XWLI
you come to require other epithets, then the people will give you the title of 
imperator, just as they gave it to your father; and they will revere you with another 
way of address (ƳƥƢƩƯ૨ƳƩƤƝƳƥƪơ੿ ਦƴƝƱ઺ ƴƩƭ੿ ưƱƯƳƱƞƳƥƩ), so that you may reap the 
crop of the reality of kingship without the odium which attaches to the name of 
¶NLQJ· 
 
On the one hand 0DHFHQDV·SUHGLFWLRQWKDWWKH5RPDQVZLOO¶UHYHUH·2FWDYLDQZLWKDQHZQDPH
(ƳƥƢƩƯ૨ƳƩ ƤƝ Ƴƥ ƪơ੿ ਦƴƝƱ઺ ƴƩƭ੿ ưƱƯƳƱƞƳƥƩ) is a rather inventive MHX G·HVSULW; it is a verbal 
foreshadowing of the SULQFHSV·new title of Augustus, or ƳƥƢơƳƴƼƲ.  
But the rhetorical flair should not disguise the real force of this passage within Cassius 
'LR·VDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHtransformation of dictatorship in the Late Republic, its problems, and 
its replacement by the Augustan Principate. From its earliest mention in the Roman History 
Dio sought to explore the dictatorship in a way distinctive within the historiography of the 
Republic. In keeping with his theoretical view of the weakness of democracy and the necessity 
of monarchy³SDUWLFXODUO\ IRU D ¶FLW\ ZKLFK UXOHV WKH ZRUOG·³Dio viewed dictatorship as a 
beneficial return to the best that monarchy had to offer. Describing it in terms reminiscent of 
&LFHUR·V Republic, Dio resisted the temptation succumbed to by Dionysius, and to a lesser 
extent Livy, to view that office from its very inception through the prism of events in the 1
st
 
century BCE; less still to describe it simplistically as a form of tyranny. Rather, Dio 
(paradoxically) believed that a successful democracy required a viable resort to monarchy in 
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 Cass. Dio 43.50.2. 
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 Cass. Dio 44.11.1. 
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 Cass. Dio 44.6.1-4. 
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 Cass. Dio 44.7.3. 
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 Cass. Dio 54.1.5. 
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 Cass. Dio 52.40.1-2. 
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times of crisis. In the Late Republic that vision collapsed. When pressed with crisis in the 
Mediterranean in 67 BCE theQuirites could not call on their traditional offices for practical and 
PRUDOUHDVRQV5RPH·VHPHUJHQF\SRZHUVKDGQRWNHSWSDFHZLWKWKHJURZWKRIHPSLUHand in 
any case the dictatorship was a discredited solution. The disastrous alternative³'LR·V&DWXOXV
warns³would be further extraordinary commands, and Pompey. Thirteen years later when 
Republican institutions had entirely broken down, Dio records continuing aversion to the 
dictatorship, ¶VLQFH LQ UHPHPEUDQFH RI 6XOOD·V FUXHOW\ DOO KDWHG WKDW RIILFH·97 The again 
disastrous alternative was a sole consulship for Pompey in 52 BCE.  
For Dio the failure of the dictatorship precipitated the failure of the Republic itself. We 
may find this outlandish. But concerns about a dictatorship in the electoral crisis of 54-53 BCE 
were evidently widespread, at least among the boni; these were articulated in the the language of 
traditional liberty, privileging the dyarchy of consuls in conversation with the Senate and 
emphasising the rejection of tyranny. Cassius Dio himself believed that such concerns were 
mistaken: the dictatorship itself was not the problem, merely the toxic combination of military 
force and an autocratic character. It is testament to his quality as an historian that he explains 
the actions of his historical characters, such as the Romans who voted for the lex Antonia, with 
rationales that he himself did not accept. Dio often resists the temptation to project his own 
views onto his actors. In Catulus in 67 or Cato and Bibulus in 53, we see individuals acting not 
DV DJHQWV RI 'LR·V hindsight, but as Republican statesmen whose proximity to events blinds 
them to the nature of the problem, and who pose ineffective and ultimately catastrophic 
solutions for their predicament.  
In the end'LR·V$XJXVWXVXQGHUVWRRGERWKWKHQHFHVVLW\RIPRQDUFK\and the need to 
redefine it. To SDUDSKUDVHWKHSUHIDFHWR7DFLWXV·Annals, he realised that he should be neither 
king nor dictator, but princeps.98 His disavowal of the dictatorship in 22 BCE has its precedent in 
3RPSH\·VUHIXVDOWKLUW\\HDUVHDUOLHU; yet to Dio$XJXVWXV·refusal³DJDLQOLNH3RPSH\·V³was not 
merely a show of recusatio imperii, much as it may have filled that additional purpose. Rather, it 
was an astute realisation of  the political reality, and a fulfilment of 0DHFHQDV· suggestion to 
cloak the fact of monarchy under new and acceptable titles. Here as so often in the Roman 
History, LWSD\VWRIROORZ0DHFHQDV·DGYLFH 
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